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With the contemporary crisis of liberal democracy and the rise of 
illiberalism in the aftermath of the global financial crisis we are 
witnessing a renewed interest in structuralist theories that 
conceptualize the inherent tensions of modernization, crises and 
democracy. In my paper I attempt to show that Polanyi’s thinking 
represents such a framework that can be updated to fit contemporary 
realities both in core and peripheral countries. After the introduction 
I reconstruct Polanyi’s political stance regarding democracy, socialism 
and the market based on a reading of his political speeches as well as 
other non-academic texts. Next I will bring to the fore his often 
neglected views regarding the commodification of money and the 
tensions between international finance and democracy. In the fourth 
section of the paper I introduce the notion of dependent 
financialization to make Polanyi’s theory of money compatible with 
non-core capitalist economies. The Polanyian theory of money allows 
us to formulate hypotheses about political dynamics in different 
varieties of core and peripheral capitalisms as well. In the final section 
of my paper I conclude that Polanyi’s theory of the double movement 
and fictitious commodification can only be understood and applied to 
empirical analysis once we bring it into dialogue with his political 
views. Polanyi urges us to preserve the market by protecting the 
economy and society from the damages of excessive commodification: 
markets need to be protected from themselves. 
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Financial crises impose immense economic, social and political losses. Financial crises 
might also lead to the rise of illiberal political forces. Economic crises are found to 
have a detrimental effect on democratic stability. Przeworski (2000) has pointed out 
that the likelihood of a democratic breakdown is tenfold in an economic recession as 
compared with a state of economic growth. In a democratic polity economic woes 
have political repercussions. With the contemporary crisis of liberal democracy and 
the rise of illiberalism (Levitsky & Way, 2002; Zakaria, 1997) in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis we are witnessing a renewed interest in structuralist theories 
(Iversen, 2009: 617) that conceptualize the inherent tensions of modernization, crises 
and democracy. In my paper I attempt to show that Polanyi’s thinking represents such 
a framework that can be updated to fit contemporary realities both in core and 
peripheral countries.  
The first thorough analysis of the politics of finance goes back to Keynes. 
Liberal economists assert that banks allocate, divide or distribute risk, but do not 
create it, that is, money is neutral. In contrast to this view, Keynes famously asserted 
that uncertainty is inherent to a market economy. By creating money through loaning 
banks infuse the whole economy with uncertainty. Until the 1930s this system was 
maintained internationally through the gold standard which had profound economic, 
social and political consequences: 
 
‘The gold standard, with its dependence on pure chance, its faith in ‘automatic 
adjustments’, and its general regardlessness of social detail, is an essential 
emblem and idol of those who sit in the top tier of the machine’ (Keynes, 
1963(1931): 262).  
 
Karl Polanyi started where Keynes left off (Polanyi-Levitt, 2005), explicitly addressing 
the political consequences of international money markets in general and fixed 
exchange rates in particular. Polanyi also draws our attention to the fact that monetary 
policy is not a technical but a deeply political question with major social implications, 
demonstrating the domestic political importance of the international monetary order. 
Polanyi is mostly cited for his theory of ‘embeddedness’ (Barber, 1995; Gemici, 
2008), however, his views on democracy and financial liberalization are rarely 
invoked. Yet, Polanyi has offered several prescient thoughts on the fictitious 
commodification of money that could serve as a valuable theoretical frame to analyse 
contemporary tensions between financial markets and democracy. Economic 
anthropologists have long recognized the value of Polanyi’s work in understanding the 
nature of money (Graeber, 2009; C. Hann & Hart, 2011; C. H. Hann, 1992; Hart, 
2009). However, most of these works have concentrated on his later writings and 
mainly took Polanyi’s article The semantics of money uses as point of reference 
(Polanyi, 1971). As Saiag (2014) shows, The Great Transformation differs from his 
later writings on money in several dimensions, but most importantly, in its analysis of 
money as part of the historical process of the rise and fall of the fiction of free markets 
and fictitious commodification. More recently, several leading post-Marxist scholars 
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have tried to revive Polanyi’s theories to reconstruct critical theory. Fred Block and 
Margaret R. Somers (2014) argue that Polanyi could be the central figure of renewing 
contemporary Left-wing thinking, echoing Burawoy’s (2003) call to reconstruct 
Marxism on a sociological ground based on Gramsci and Polanyi. Social movement 
theorists have also rediscovered Polanyi’s notion of the double movement to 
conceptualize movements fighting for a counter-hegemonic globalization (Evans, 
2008; Munck, 2004). 
Polanyi’s work has been subjected to historical-empirical (Duncan & Tandy, 
1996) and theoretical criticism as well. It has been pointed out that in The Great 
Transformation Polanyi was sensitive to the moral and the practical limitations of 
commodification, yet he was less sensitive to the relations of domination present in 
non-market societies, such as slavery, feudal subordination or gender inequalities 
(Fraser, 2014). Polemically targeting economic liberalism Polanyi was also less 
sensitive to the ways in which marketization actually improved the lives of people 
(Kindleberger, 1974) and thus was too quick to condemn liberal capitalism to death 
(Polanyi-Levitt, 2005: 175). The recent article by Hodgson (2016) offers a thorough 
critique of the ambiguousness of the terms society, economy and embeddedness in 
Polanyi’s works as well as pointing out the future direction for possible conceptual 
clarifications. However, Hodgson also maintains the relevance of the concept of 
fictitious commodities and the theory institutionalization of the market. 
Notwithstanding the need for further clarification I will rely on the political economic 
theory of money as laid out in The Great Transformation to offer a structural theory 
of the tension between financial markets and democracy.  
In my article I join the recent scholarship on Polanyi that aims to bring his 
theory of money to understanding the politics of contemporary financial crises (Block, 
2015; Harmes, 2001; Helleiner, 2006; Holmes, 2014; Kara, 2014; Polanyi-Levitt, 
2005, 2013; Woodruff, 2016). This literature focuses on the core capitalist countries, 
mostly the eurozone. By introducing the notion of dependent financialization I show 
that Polanyi’s theory can be updated to analyse structural tensions between financial 
markets and democracy in semi-peripheral countries even without the presence of a 
fixed exchange rate or an outright currency union like the eurozone. Polanyi was the 
first political economist to link international financial liberalization to the erosion of 
democracy. He was also one of the first to forcefully argue that proponents of 
freedom have to regulate the free market to protect not only society but the 
productive process itself otherwise wholesale attacks on the institutions of freedom 
seem to be inevitable. In my paper I intend to show that Polanyi was deeply 
committed to the principles of freedom and democracy, and his critique of 
marketization was not meant to completely overhaul the institution of the market but 
to embed it into social regulation to reconcile it with democratic sustainability. The 
thrust of Polanyi’s argument about the perils of fictitious commodification is that 
democracy can only be sustained if the operation of the market in general and money 
in particular is embedded into regulation. Failing to recognize this interrelation leads 
to the rise of antidemocratic forces according to Polanyi. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The Great Transformation does not offer a 
detailed theory of democracy thus we need to look at Polanyi’s earlier writings to have 
a clear understanding of his democratic ideal. In the next section I will reconstruct 
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Polanyi’s political stance regarding democracy, socialism and the market based on a 
reading of his political speeches as well as other non-academic texts. In the third 
section I will bring to the fore his views regarding the commodification of money and 
the tensions between international finance and democracy as laid out in The Great 
Transformation. In the fourth section of the paper I introduce the notion of 
dependent financialization to show how the structural tensions inherent to liberal 
finance analysed by Polanyi can be applied to semi-peripheral countries even without 
a fixed exchange rate regime. The Polanyian theory of money allows us to formulate 
hypotheses about political dynamics in different varieties of capitalism. In the final 
section of my paper I conclude that Polanyi’s theory of the double movement and 
fictitious commodification can only be understood and applied to empirical analysis 
once we bring it into dialogue with his theory of democracy. Democracy can only be 
sustained in the era of dependent financialization if society reasserts control of money 
and democratizes the economy.  
 
2. Polanyi’s theory of democracy 
 
Before leaving Hungary and devoting his life to social science Polanyi was active in 
politics. He started his public involvement as an intellectual fellow of György Lukács, 
Oszkár Jászi and Endre Ady and became one of the most active organizers of the 
Galilei Circle, a Hungarian movement of progressive university students (see 
Csunderlik, 2016). As a young intellectual in Budapest he even had a brief flirtation 
with politics as a key figure of the short lived Civic Radical Party and became its 
spokesman and secretary general. Polanyi was said to be an excellent orator. In fact, in 
the turn-of-century Budapest the Polanyi family was at the centre of the progressive 
movement (Congdon, 1976; Dale, 2009; Litván, 2005).  
The civic radicals of the era were fighting for a parallel democratization of the 
economic and the political sphere. Much in common with social democrats they were 
not only demanding land redistribution among the rural poor and for limiting class 
cleavages in life chances but also for the establishment of a modern liberal republic in 
place of the defunct and profoundly illiberal monarchy of the pre-First World War 
Hungary. Thus the radicalism of Polanyi and the Radical Party was based on the 
notion of equality also recognizing that political equality requires certain level of 
economic equality as well. Although he sympathized with the socialist movements of 
the era, in his most prominent political speech delivered at the convention of the 
Radical Party in 1918 in Szeged Polanyi gave a succinct overview of the programme 
and strategy of the party and also juxtaposed it to the ‘scientific socialism’ of 
contemporary Marxism (Polanyi, 1986b). As a central figure of social democratic 
thinking Polanyi was too much to the Left for the liberals, and too liberal for the 
radical Left. His progressivism was that of the welfare state, mixed economy (Szelényi, 
1991), Robert Owen, social rights and the social regulation of the market (Holmwood, 
2000), most closely resembling the Swedish or Nordic model of social democracy 
(Berman, 2006). 
Central to Polanyi’s critique of economic liberalism is his ideal of positive or 
substantial freedom (on the idea of positive freedom see Sen, 1999). His attack on 
economic liberalism connects the collapse of the gold standard and the rise of fascism 
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to the rise of the ideal of self-regulating markets. Polanyi considers it to be a grave 
error to mistake freedom for free markets, for the lack of state involvement. To 
prevent fascism democratic forces need to abandon the illusion of the self-regulating 
market and endorse regulation and planning to re-embed the market into society 
(Polanyi, 1935). According to Polanyi, human freedom and the functioning of the 
market both require state involvement into economic affairs. The notion of freedom 
as a lack of state interference as propagated by orthodox economic liberalism conceals 
‘such brutal restrictions of freedom as were involved in the occurrence of 
unemployment and destitution’ (Polanyi, 2001[1944]: 266).  
Polanyi’s strong criticism directed at economic liberalism does not mean a 
rejection of political liberalism (Kuttner, 2014). Although he eschewed the liberal 
utopia of self-regulating free markets (calling that ‘our obsolete market mentality’ 
(Polanyi, 1947)) and was an ardent supporter of regulation and planning both 
nationally and internationally, Polanyi was not a proponent of ideologies fetishizing 
state power. He feared individual freedom would be threatened not only by the dis-
embedded economy but by a dis-embedded, non-democratic state as well (Ebner, 
2011). Foreshadowing the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, Polanyi thought that 
‘The Machine Age’, as he called industrial society, is not only threatening freedom 
through the exploitation of men and nature but through bureaucratic control of 
human creativity as well (Polanyi, 1947). The last chapter of The Great 
Transformation is titled Freedom in a complex society, a text that Polanyi planned to 
develop into another monograph but did not have the time to do so. Individual 
freedom (especially ‘the right to non-conformity’) must be guaranteed in democratic 
socialism but this can only be achieved if we depart from the notion of freedom as 
free enterprise into which the liberal idea degenerated according to Polanyi. Freedom 
can only be fulfilled in and through society: democratic society has to be organized in 
a transparent way so as to provide ground for the informed and responsible 
intervention of individuals, who thereby achieve a new and ‘positive’ form of social 
freedom (Cangiani, 2012: 45).Therefore, institutions of planning and redistribution at 
the root of the welfare state, have to be embedded into social and communal 
coordination according to Polanyi to preserve freedom. As a democratic socialist, he 
believed that freedom can only be guaranteed through social or communal regulation. 
For Polanyi   
 
‘socialism is, essentially, the tendency inherent in an industrial civilization to 
transcend the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to a 
democratic society (2001[1944]: 242).  
‘the class of the employed can defend themselves against the fateful effects of 
industrial vicissitudes upon their personal lives only by deliberate political 
interference with the automatic laws governing capitalist markets and currency-
systems, interest and wage-rates.’ (Polanyi, 1934: 128).  
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Polanyi devoted several articles to the theory of democratic socialism during his stay in 
Austria. Following his disappointment with Hungarian politics he left for Vienna, 
where he spent more than ten years as a journalist also studying economics and 
sociology. In the 1920s he engaged in a debate with Mises (the mentor and patron of 
Hayek) and other economic liberals about the possibility of socialist accounting 
(Rosner, 1990). In his response to Mises Polanyi laid out his theory of functional 
socialism and did not argue for the elimination of wage labour but wanted to use 
regulation and planning to curtail unequal income, insecurity or unemployment 
(Polanyi, 1924). As Sommers and Block (2014: 32) point out, Polanyi believed that 
politics and other social norms and regulations effectively define the actual meaning of 
ownership, therefore the question is what those regulations and norms allow and 
prohibit and not who actually owns capital. In a letter to Oszkár Jászi he suggested 
that: 
 
‘Land, money and labour should not be left to the market. Apart from this the 
free operation of the market should be left intact.’ (Quoted in Litván, 1991: 
260)  
‘The end of market society means in no way the absence of markets. These 
continue, in various fashions, to ensure the freedom of the consumer, to 
indicate the shifting of demand, to influence producers’ income, and to serve as 
an instrument of accountancy, while ceasing altogether to be an organ of 
economic self-regulation.’ (Polanyi, 2001[1944]: 260) 
 
This type of socialism resembles a corporatist system of industrial democracy with 
public property of the means of production that is governed by industrial associations 
and consumer organisations, and wages and prices regulated in terms of social values 
through democratic bargaining (Ebner, 2011). Polanyi’s theory of democracy rests on 
his view of the inseparable nature of the economy and polity. Most of his articles on 
democracy in fact dealt with the extension of democracy to the economy through 
controlling and curtailing commodification (Cangiani, 2006).  
Although Polanyi saw the final guarantee of democracy in democratizing the 
economy, he was not economistic in the sense of equating productive forces, the 
economic structure, with the base that determines political outcomes. For Polanyi 
(1947), economic determinism of Marxism is as equally misleading as the liberal 
fiction of the free market. Influenced by the theory of commodity fetishism in early 
Marx (see Block, 2003; Brown, 1987), along the lines of humanist, liberal socialism he 
questioned the whole idea of separating material and non-material interests as driving 
human behaviour, for him the two are bound together (Özel, 1997). Echoing Weber’s 
non-economistic theory of class (Wright, 2009) Polanyi understood that social 
protection is not only about wages and living standards but also about respect and 
dignity. For Polanyi, the need for recognition is at least as important as material 
interests: 
 
‘Purely economic matters such as affect want-satisfaction are incomparably less 
relevant to class behaviour than questions of social recognition. Want-
satisfaction may be, of course, the result of such recognition, especially as its 
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outward sign or prize. But the interests of a class most directly refer to standing 
and rank, to status and security, that is, they are primarily not economic but 
social.’ (Polanyi, 2001[1944]: 160) 
 
Economic power yields political power, but politics can be used to act against the 
interests of economic power holders and to ensure democratic equality. This 
approach to democracy also means that Polanyi’s theory of democracy is of a political 
sociological nature, treating democracy as a socially and historically contingent 
phenomenon instead of an abstract ideal (see Polanyi, 1986a). Democracy should be 
understood in relation to mass politics or working class action. His emphasis on 
popular action went hand in hand with his life-long commitment to workers 
education. The ultimate source of democratic political change is not a Marxist or 
liberal vanguard but the social creativity that lies in the culture of common people 
(Polanyi-Levitt & Mendell, 1987). His commitment to progressive populism and his 
belief in the revolutionary potential of common people was also signified by his last 
book co-edited with his wife, the Plough and the Pen (Duczynska & Polanyi, 1963), a 
volume consisting of works by Hungarian populists.  
Understanding Polanyi’s political views is vital to comprehending and applying 
his theory of the fictitious commodification of money and its backlash on democracy. 
Polanyi was committed to the view that separating the economy and society is an 
analytical and political error and therefore the theory of democracy has to be built on 
a theory of the economy. His critique against economic liberalism is based on a 
positive theory of freedom that can be maintained only if the economy is subjected to 
political control. Yet, his insistence on a non-economistic conception of democratic 
socialism is crucial to avoid the pitfalls functionalism that Polanyian analyses of 
globalization and resistance often fall into. There is no preordained movement against 
commodification: the outcome of political struggles depends on political organization. 
This democratic autonomy of the political sphere against democracy can only be 
fulfilled if it is used to re-embed the economy into social control. The most important 
element of the economy that drives the deep tensions between democracy and 
markets is money. Therefore I turn in the next section to Polanyi’s analysis of the 
commodification of money. 
 
3. The great transformation of money 
 
In The Great Transformation Polanyi showed that liberal economists have mistaken 
labour, land and money as commodities leading to a complete misunderstanding of 
the working of the economy. Therefore, following what Polanyi (1957) later called the 
substantive view of the economy, economic analysis has to transcend the focus on 
efficient use of scarce resources and become sensitive to history and social 
embeddedness of the market. ‘Fictitious commodification’ is one of the central 
elements of Polanyi’s theory about capitalist crisis. It is not only morally wrong to treat 
land, labour and money as commodities, but leaving these spheres completely to the 
market also leads to a breakdown of the functioning of the market and society. Market 
societies therefore need the state and thus need some form of political decision 
making to guide state involvement in the economy. Society will in some way react to 
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the imposition of a fictive free market leading to what Polanyi calls ‘the double 
movement’. For Polanyi, the most important element of this historical development 
was in the sphere of money. Money is at the centre stage of his historical account of 
the rise and fall of liberal capitalism. Speaking about the collapse of the order of 
peace, the collapse of global capitalism and the rise of fascism he writes ‘the gold 
standard proved crucial; its fall was the proximate cause of the catastrophe’ (Polanyi, 
2001[1944]: 3). 
Polanyi’s approach to international monetary affairs is clearly at odds with the 
classical view that separates the ‘monetary’ and ‘real’ spheres of the economy. Much 
of the mainstream analytical efforts to understand money treated it purely as a neutral 
expression of exchange value. According to this orthodox view of money there are no 
particular political preconditions and no major political implications of money, that is, 
money is neutral. The Great Transformation questions this view of money and places 
it in the history of the development of market society as a fictitious commodity. For 
Polanyi, both the rise and fall of the market system and the political challenges 
induced by the fixed exchange rate regime of the gold standard cannot be analysed 
separately from monetary policies and the collective representation of money. In his 
theory of money Polanyi thus departs both from the subjectivist theory underpinning 
neoclassical economics and the labour value theory underpinning classical and 
Marxist economics (Maucourant, 2001). Polanyi’s approach to money is non-
essentialist and institutionalist: he treats the economy and money as an institution that 
expresses empirical regularities of social life and as such is linked to the existing social 
order. From this it follows that money might take different forms and have different 
functions in society.  
In his later writings Polanyi made an analytical distinction between ‘special 
purpose money’ and ‘all purpose money’ (Polanyi, 1957, 1971), maintaining that 
money had various functions in non-modern societies but in modern market society 
money has become ‘all purpose money’ (Melitz, 1970). This view of money in market 
society differs from that of The Great Transformation that treats money as an 
historically specific institution in modern societies that has social and political 
functions and cannot be conceptualized as a universal means of exchange (Saiag, 
2014). I agree with Holmes (2014) that we need to follow the logic of The Great 
Transformation and adhere to the special purpose view of money. This way we can 
conceptualize the power relations within which money as a social relation functions: 
money is more than a universal means of exchange, it can be a unit of accounting (for 
debt), purchasing power and also a disciplinary tool of neoliberal governmentality. In 
fact, as Polanyi points out, economic liberals also recognized the limitations of the 
view of money as a universal means of exchange and thus a commodity.  
As Polanyi describes in the first chapter of The Great Transformation, the only 
exception where liberals tended to openly accept state intervention was the sphere of 
money. Stable exchange rates between national currencies were central to maintaining 
the liberal order of the 19th century, thus the protection of the exchange rate became 
one of the most important tasks of governments. Monetary stability was considered a 
prerequisite for the international expansion of the market, without which the free 
international movement of goods and capital could easily be jeopardized by sudden 
movements of the exchange rate. During the first era of globalization in the 19th 
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century, international financial investments (in the forms of railways, colonial 
companies, or international lending) grew to an unprecedented scale. Polanyi argues 
that international investors of the era – haute finance as he calls this faction of the 
economic elite – became strongly interested in the maintenance of peace and 
monetary stability. They were able to put pressure on governments – who would by 
themselves not be too much concerned with international peace – through the lever of 
lending. Thus the system of fixed exchange rates was born representing the highest 
form of the fictitious commodification of money. Yet, money has not been produced 
solely to function as a universal means of exchange. The whole working of the 
economy rests on it, therefore the quantity and price of money cannot be decided 
through the market as that would undermine the working of democracy: 
 
Yet if profits depend upon prices, then the monetary arrangements upon which 
prices depend must be vital to the functioning of any system motivated by 
profits. […] Hence, if the price level was falling for monetary reasons over a 
considerable time, business would be in danger of liquidation accompanied by 
the dissolution of productive organization and massive destruction of capital 
(Polanyi, 2001[1944]: 201) 
 
The creation of the fictitious commodity of money – just as the creation of labour and 
land as commodities – required a new bureaucratic state and a series of new 
regulations to protect the functioning of the economy itself. Not only was the creation 
of the gold standard a result of deliberate political action, but so was the emergence of 
central banking to ensure the smooth running of the money market. Hence the 
remark by Polanyi: “laissez faire was planned – planning was not” (Polanyi, 
2001[1944]: 147). The establishment of the gold standard and the free movement of 
money not only created problems for the producers but it often involved painful 
internal adjustment to preserve the value of money and protect fixed exchange rates. 
Fluctuations in economic processes induced by unchecked market forces went 
beyond the endurance of society calling forth protective measures of various kinds, 
from social insurance through social policies to tariffs and protectionism. Polanyi also 
notes how an internationally interconnected system of national economies might 
exaggerate these problems:  
 
Under the gold standard—which we all the time assume to be in force—any 
governmental measure that caused a budgetary deficit might start a depreciation 
of the currency; if, on the other hand, unemployment was being fought by the 
expansion of bank credit, rising domestic prices would hit exports and affect the 
balance of payment in that way. In either case exchanges would slump and the 
country feel the pressure on its currency.’ (Polanyi, 2001[1944]: 209)  
 
The collapse of 19th century liberalism and the rise of fascism cannot therefore be 
understood without looking at the liberalized international economic system of the 19th 
– early 20th centuries also encompassing an analysis of the interaction between fixed 
exchange rates and the inability of the government to react to international economic 
disturbances and unemployment. Polanyi clearly understood this dynamic 
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interrelatedness of democratic politics and social protection against the effects of 
international free markets and the exchange rate. As Holmes (2014: 585) points out, 
the contradictory goals of sustaining the gold standard and defending the domestic 
economy led to the final collapse of the gold standard system. Nationalism and the 
ideology of autarchy took the place of liberal internationalism. There was no 
international mechanism to protect the economy (the Bretton Woods Institutions 
were established decades later), therefore national solutions became the only possible 
form of social protection against the fictitious commodification of money. 
The collapse of the gold standard thus was not a result of errant politicians 
choosing bad policies or self-interested workers looking for protection but rather was 
an inevitable result of the imposition of the fictitious commodity of money upon 
society. The countries that were able to survive the thirties with the least inclination to 
succumb to illiberal forces were the countries first to abandon the gold standard. In 
the US, the New Deal would have been impossible without the country leaving the 
gold standard system. Polanyi also points out that in the case of macroeconomic 
adjustment through internal deflation liberals in effect chose the principle of price 
stability and the maintenance of the value of the currency and the gold standard over 
non-intervention and advised governments to push for the reduction of wages:  
 
The stubbornness with which economic liberals, for a critical decade, had, in 
the service of deflationary policies, supported authoritarian interventionism, 
merely resulted in a decisive weakening of the democratic forces which might 
otherwise have averted the fascist catastrophe. Great Britain and the United 
States—masters not servants of the currency—went off gold in time to escape this 
peril.’ (Polanyi, 2001[1944]: 242) 
 
Polanyi described three major reactions to the Great Depression. In Central Europe, 
most notably Germany, the contradicting demands of different classes led to a high 
levels of debt and a democratic stalemate. Neither the rentier class nor the workers 
could prevail, inducing a prolonged political crisis and a loss of confidence in 
democratic politics and thus paved the way to fascism. Fascism according to Polanyi 
was the negation of democracy and the upholding of capitalism resulting in a 
disciplinary state. In England, according to Polanyi, democracy could be sustained 
only because the rentier class was able to defeat the working class politically. Investors 
thus did not have to fear a political backlash against their interests and could abandon 
the gold standard to which they had insistently adhered until the fall of the labour 
government and the failure of mass strikes. Finally, the third way according to Polanyi 
was that of the United States where Roosevelt building on the restructured 
Democratic Party was able to defeat the interests of Wall Street politically and 
abandon the gold standard.  
Polanyi thus suggested that by opening up national economic decision making 
to parties representing working-class interests through the extension of the right to vote 
clearly played an important role in the fall of the gold standard system. However, the 
interplay of global finance and domestic politics did not necessarily lead to the 
collapse of democracy and the rise of fascism. The fate of democracy rested on the 
fate of the gold standard – the central expression of the fictitious commodification of 
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money. Governments that went off the gold standard were able to retain democracy. 
Polanyi points out that the common external factor of the gold standard led to 
divergent political outcomes in different countries based on local economic and 
political histories and different policy choices. By abandoning the gold standard and 
subjecting money to political control, democracy could be rescued. This solution 
depended on the balance of class forces and the different varieties of societal 
organization leading to divergent outcomes in response to the Great Depression.  
 
4. The political trilemma of dependent financialization  
 
Contemporary economists have produced several waves of theories of financial crises, 
most of them unaware of Polanyi’s prescient analysis provided in The Great 
Transformation. Yet, Polanyi’s theory is still relevant and can be updated to fit 
contemporary realities. In a similar fashion to the gold standard, currency pegs and 
currency unions (binding the exchange rate of one currency to the other) were widely 
recommended throughout the eighties and nineties to developing countries in the 
framework of the Washington Consensus. Reinhart and Vegh (1999) find that in most 
cases exchange based price stabilization was much slower than expected from the 
fixed exchange rate currency regime. The persistence of inflation differentials however 
leads to real overvaluation and seriously destabilizes the domestic economy through 
the loss of competiveness. The slow convergence of inflation rates fuels a large real 
exchange rate appreciation which, together with the fall in private saving, leads to large 
current account imbalances and over-borrowing. This situation brings the Polanyian 
tensions of the commodification of money to the fore again. 
Governments might react in two ways to such a loss of external competitiveness 
under a fixed exchange rate regime. The first type of reaction follows the suggestion of 
liberal economists – similarly to the economists analysed by Polanyi – to maintain the 
exchange rate which requires an internal devaluation to restore competitiveness: 
cutting wages, cutting social spending, decreasing pensions and cutting internal 
consumption. The fall in internal prices would restore competitiveness, boost exports 
and thus the crisis would be overcome. However, workers – as analysed by Polanyi – 
are reluctant to accept cuts to wages, and their resistance could lead to increasing 
unemployment and increasing public spending. Internal devaluation, a deflation of 
prices is always a painful measure to restore international monetary balance. 
Democratic governments, especially Left-wing governments relying on the votes of 
those hurt by deflation, are reluctant to allow such adjustment and are inclined to 
protect society from the pressure emanating from international financial markets. A 
second possible reaction to the problem of the loss of international competitiveness 
and currency overvaluation is not internal devaluation but external devaluation 
through a change in the value of the currency. However, this requires monetary policy 
autonomy to modify the exchange rate and this autonomy is not present in the system 
of fixed exchange rates as the gold standard of the 19th century or today’s euro and 
other currency pegs. 
The so called second generation economic models of financial crises address 
this tension between democratic governance and international financial adjustment 
(Eichengreen, Rose, Wyplosz, Dumas, & Weber, 1995). The central question for 
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these theories is how governments will react to the double pressure, one emanating 
from the international financial market the other from the drive to protect society 
from the effect of adjustment. Although a government might be able financially to 
protect the currency against speculative pressures, but the political cost of doing so 
through internal devaluation (cuts to real wage) might induce the government to 
abandon the fixed exchange rate (Obstfeld, 1986). Although economic scholarship on 
financial crises clearly endogenizes political considerations they fall short of a deep 
political analysis of the tensions between international monetary order and 
democracy.  
Among contemporary economists it was Barry Eichengreen to first note the 
usefulness of Polanyi’s analysis of the collapse of the gold standard and the 
embeddedness of the monetary sphere into political processes. Inspired by Polanyi, 
Eichengreen (1996) points out that the stability of the nineteenth-century gold 
standard was possible because of the lack of mass democratic politics and the 
insulation of economic policy-making from democratic pressures. Before the mass 
extension of the franchise it was easier for governments to orchestrate internal 
deflation of prices as the social repercussions were not directly felt politically. The 
international macroeconomic model of the impossibility trilemma developed by Dani 
Rodrik goes even further in integrating political and economic analysis. Updating 
Rodrik’s framework with the Polanyian notion of double movement as a reaction to 
fictitious commodification offers a powerful conceptual tool for international political 
economic analysis.  
In his paper The Governance of Globalization Rodrik (2000) describes the 
political trilemma of the world economy as the impossibility to simultaneously pursue 
deep international economic integration, democratic mass politics and the sovereignty 
of the nation-state. According to the model, we have to choose either to curb 
integration to retain the nation-state and democratic politics; or maintain integration 
and the nation-state but abandon democratic politics; or to say farewell to the nation 
state and re-create democracy and the international level. As opposed to Polanyi, 
Rodrik thinks in terms of good policies and not in power relations that bring about 
various institutional orders. Rodrik’s model is analytically more rigorous but static, 
whereas Polanyi’s account of the great transformation was less rigorous but more 
dynamic. We need to be able to conceptualize the trilemma not as a theoretical 
impossibility of policy choices but as a dynamically evolving tension among the state, 
international capital flows and democracy that is driven by the structural dynamics of 
the changing balance class forces. This trilemma can be played out differently 
according to divergent local political structures. The double movement emanates from 
the political trilemma but takes different forms in different countries. Combining 
Rodrik and Polanyi offers a theoretically sophisticated understanding of the various 
ways in which external and internal political and economic forces shape each other. 
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Democracy, state autonomy and deep international economic integration are 
incompatible goals, and imposition of the fiction of free markets leads to social 
protective mechanisms. Similar political tensions have surfaced with the crisis of the 
eurozone (Holmes, 2014; Kara, 2014; Woodruff, 2016). Yet, it does not require a 
fully fledged currency union or a fixed exchange rate for the tensions of fictitious 
commodification to surface. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system a new 
era of liberal finance has started as was described by the literature on financialization 
(Davis & Kim, 2015; Epstein, 2005). Further research could demonstrate the 
usefulness of Polanyi in understanding how the growth strategies of several externally 
indebted countries of peripheral Eastern Europe that could be characterized as 
dependent financialization lead to democratic tensions (Myant & Drahokoupil, 2012; 
Roaf, Atoyan, Joshi, & Krogulsk, 2014; Smith & Swain, 2010).  
There are significant differences in the way various countries of the European 
periphery developed their vulnerabilities and reacted to crises. Political structures 
diverge, different varieties of capitalism (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012) allow different 
resolutions of the political trilemma inherent to dependent financialization. The 
tradition of identity politics in the Baltic states allowed more space for political 
toleration of internal devaluation as opposed to Hungary for example. The trilemma 
not only developed in countries with fixed exchange rates but in countries where 
foreign currency debt tied the hands of monetary authorities. Bound to the rule of the 
free flow of capital in the EU and unable to significantly devalue their currencies due 
to high levels of private foreign currency debt the only option for the government in 
Hungary was to follow the logic of deflation: cut budgetary expenses and decrease real 
wages. The fictitious commodification of money, the uncontrolled flow of cross-
border debt and emergence of institutional infrastructure of liberal finance pitted the 
logic of democratic politics against the maintenance of the confidence of investors. 
We can conclude with the posing the hypothesis that the collapse of the Hungarian 
Left and the rise of illiberalism can be understood using Polanyi’s notion of the 
Deep international 
economic integration 
Nation-state Democratic politics 
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double movement as a reaction to the commodification of money in the form of 




Polanyi’s analysis of the collapse of the gold standard has many important implications 
for today’s financial crises and the resulting pressures on democracy. Without 
meaningful intervention and financial assistance to those countries that got into deep 
trouble during the crisis with their fixed exchange rates, a democratic collapse and a 
rise of political forces negating freedom can be the result. Fictitious commodification 
creates similar tensions under the regime of the gold standard, the eurozone or 
dependent financialization. The crucial question politically as well as analytically is 
what form the regulation of free markets will take and in what form the double 
movement emerges. Although monetary policy seems to be a technical problem better 
left to experts, applying the framework of Polanyi we are able to transcend the narrow 
focus of classical economics and realize that monetary policy is in fact deeply political 
with major social implications. 
Bringing Polanyi’s theory of the double movement into dialogue with his 
political views we can formulate a non-functionalist theory of the double movement. 
In the second section I showed that the motivation of Polanyi was to protect freedom 
including the working of the market albeit in a limited and embedded form. For 
Polanyi, democracy is only complete if the economy is democratized. If the economy 
is separated from politics then the power of capital prevails thus reducing the equality 
of citizens into a mere façade disguising the rule of economic interests. Polanyi’s 
analysis of the tensions between democracy and finance is only complete by bringing 
in his political views. This way we can better understand his urge to preserve the 
market by protecting the economy and society from the damages of excessive 
commodification: for Polanyi, markets need to be protected from themselves. 
Polanyi is right in pointing out that people will react in some form to 
dislocations, but this reaction could take many forms falling in three broad categories 
as famously pointed out by Albert Hirschman (1970): exit, voice or loyalty. That is, 
even if workers or citizens are hurt by the process of commodification, they still might 
chose to exit the political sphere, become disillusioned with the possibility of change 
and not engage in any form of social protection. It is thus far from clear what form the 
double movement might take. Understanding these reactions requires sophisticated 
analyses of movement building and political formation. Nevertheless, after stripping 
Polanyi’s theory of its excessive functionalism, treating it as a macro-historical and 
institutional account of political and economic processes without taking any form of 
reaction to them as preordained, his main argument about the tension between free 
markets and democratic politics remains valid and powerful. 
In the closing section of The Great Transformation Polanyi points out that 
both fascism and socialism were representatives of the double movement toward 
social protectionism, but whereas fascism rested on complete negation of freedom, 
the theory of socialism was built with freedom at centre stage. For Polanyi, socialism 
essentially means democratic socialism, a strong from of social democracy, with the 
preservation of markets within a system of public regulation, social protection and 
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planning. It is a question of local social characteristics, local path dependencies and 
local histories of class formation and ideological struggle what form the double 
movement will take. It might induce the rise of illiberal forces, it might result in 
pervasive withdrawal from politics or might give rise to new progressive forces aiming 
to deepen democracy through curtailing the fictitious commodification of money. 
Herein lies the potential of a Polanyian analysis of the commodification of money and 
the divergent reactions to it. 
By securing social rights, supporting trade unions to fight for higher wages, 
providing public services and social insurance the social burden of international 
macroeconomic shocks might be eased. However, this will also necessitate the 
abandonment of completely liberal global financial markets and a return to capital 
controls and managed exchange rate regimes, and the introduction of international 
wealth and transaction taxes (e.g. Tobin-tax) as well as strong national and 
international regulation of lending to curtail the fictitious commodification of money. 
This way, society, democratic politics and the market based system of production 
might be protected from the negative effects of fictitious commodification. The real 
option against illiberalism for political liberals and democratic socialists is to uphold 
freedom against the illusion of the free market and fictitious commodification to 
protect society from the market: 
‘The discovery of society is thus either the end or the rebirth of freedom. 
While the fascist resigns himself to relinquishing freedom and glorifies power which is 
the reality of society, the socialist resigns himself to that reality and upholds the claim 
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